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The basic facts of black economic progress are well known.'
Since 1940, black wages and occupational status have improved, ap-
proaching the higher levels that Whites enjoy.2 Beginning in 1965,
the rate of improvement in black relative wages and occupational
status accelerated. However, since 1975, relative black economic
status has not advanced and may have deteriorated slightly. The
South is the region of the United States where Blacks have made the
most dramatic gains in relative wages and occupational status.
Since 1964 both the legislative and executive branches of the fed-
eral government have made substantial efforts to eliminate racial
disparity in employment and wages. Congress enacted Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 19643 in response to a growing national con-
sensus that racial discrimination perpetuated the economic, po-
litical, and social. subordination of black Americans. 4 Title VII
expressed a broad Congressional objective to prohibit employers
from making employment decisions on the basis of race.5 In 1965,
t A. Whitney Griswold Professor of Economics, Yale University.
tt Law clerk to judge Ralph K. Winter, United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit and doctoral candidate, Department of Economics, Yale University.
1. For more technically sophisticated surveys of the economic literature relating to
employment discrimination and racial disparity, see Donohue & Heckman, Continuous
Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Affirmative Action and Civil Rights Policy on the Economic
Status of Blacks, J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming 1990); Cain, The Economic Analysis of
Labor Market Discrimination- A Survey, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS (1986).
2. References to "relative" characteristics, such as earnings or years of education,
are to the black/white ratio of these characteristics unless otherwise noted.
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241,253-66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)). In 1972, Congress broadened the coverage of Title VII to
include educational institutions, state and local governments, and firms with 15 to 25
employees. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (1972).
4. Supporters of Title VII offered a variety of political, economic, and moral argu-
ments for outlawing employment discrimination. However, one aphoristic excerpt from
the House Report on the bill captures the essential character of these arguments: "The
right to vote.., does not have much meaning on an empty stomach." Additional Com-
ments of McCullough et al., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2487, 2513.
5. Section 703(a) provides:
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President Johnson issued Executive Order 11,246 prohibiting racial
discrimination by federal contractors and imposing affirmative ac-
tion obligations upon them. 6 Where Title VII focuses on unlawful
employment practices, Executive Order enforcement efforts have
emphasized direct monitoring of minority representation in the
workforces of government contractors.
This article attempts to evaluate the role of these federal antidis-
crimination policies in eliminating the economic disparity between
black and white Americans. Economists are divided in explaining
the observed improvements in black relative wages and occupa-
tional status. One group of economists emphasizes the role of long-
run trends in migration and education, and minimizes the impor-
tance of federal policy. A competing group claims that federal pres-
sure has reduced labor market discrimination, producing a
concomitant increase in demand for black workers. Evidence exists
to support both groups' positions.
Migration and education were important factors in the long run
improvement of black economic status, but they do not explain the
post-1965 increase in the rate of improvement.. Rather, the coinci-
dence of increased federal antidiscrimination pressure in the mid-
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b), (c) (1982) (parallel
prohibitions for employment agencies and labor organizations). Other titles of the Act
prohibited racial discrimination in voting, public facilities and education, and in the pro-
vision of hotel and restaurant accommodations. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
The Supreme Court has translated the general statutory prohibition of Title VII into
two basic theories of liability-disparate impact and disparate treatment. A disparate
treatment case alleges that an employment decision involved intentional racial discrimi-
nation. The order and allocation of burdens of proof in disparate treatment cases is
explained in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-60 (1981).
For the original statement of the disparate treatment theory, see McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In contrast, if an employer's selection criterion
disqualifies a disproportionate number of black candidates and does not "serv[e], in a
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer," it is unlawful under
the disparate impact theory, regardless of whether the employer's motivation was ra-
cially discriminatory. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125-26
(1989). For the original statement of the disparate impact theory, see Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975).
6. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 compilation) (issued Sept. 24,
1965). President Johnson's antidiscrimination order was by no means the first executive
action condemning employment discrimination. In fact, the federal contract antidis-
crimination program began in 1.941. For further discussion of the early Executive Or-
ders, see infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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1960s with the acceleration in the rate of black progress beginning
in 1965 makes it plausible that federal pressure caused the improve-
ment in black status. In addition, black wage and occupational gains
were concentrated in the South, where employment discrimination
was most severe, and where federal enforcement activity was most
vigorous during the period 1965 to 1975. This suggests that the
federal government's efforts to reduce southern employment dis-
crimination influenced the improvement in black relative economic
status. 7
The southern concentration of black gains also provides some in-
sight into the mechanism by which the law achieved its effects. Prior
to federal intervention, many southern labor markets, like much of
southern society and politics, were segregated. White employers
excluded black workers from important sectors and occupations.
State and local governmental officials often disregarded or inter-
fered with the civil rights of Blacks, but only one state, South Caro-
lina, had laws mandating employment segregation, and those
regulations applied only to the textile industry.8 In most southern
states, however, informal social codes effectively regulated individ-
ual conduct and severely constrained employers' conduct. 9 The
7. Although black relative wages have improved, reported wage statistics overstate
the magnitude of the improvement. The most compelling statistical evidence of black
economic progress is based only on the labor market experience of employed Blacks.
Black unemployment rates have been historically, and remain, roughly twice the rates
for Whites, and the labor force participation rate for black men has fallen significantly
since the mid-1960s. Since a greater proportion of low wage black workers than of low
wage white workers has dropped out of the labor force, declining participation rates
have raised the average wage of employed black workers relative to Whites. Such wage
growth is spurious. Thus, not only has relative black labor supply diminished-a dis-
turbing development in its own right-but also the relatively greater proportion of black
labor market dropouts has manufactured some fraction of black relative wage growth as
a statistical artifact. Butler & Heckman, The Government's Impact on the Labor Market Status
of Black Americans: A Critical Review, in EQUAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 235
(1977); see also Heckman, The Impact of Government on the Economic Status of Black Americans,
in THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 50
(1989) (estimating that labor market dropouts account for 15 to 25 percent of black
relative wage growth); Brown, Black-White Earnings Ratios Since the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
The Importance of Labor Market Dropouts, 99 QJ. ECON. 31, 38 (1984) (suggesting a figure
of 60 percent).
8. See Heckman & Payner, Determining the Impact of FederalAntidiscrimination Policy on the
Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 138 (1989); see also
Butler, Heckman & Payner, The Impact of the Economy and the State on the Economic Status of
Blacks a Study of South Carolina, in MARKETS IN HISTORY: ECONOMIC STUDIES OF THE PAST
240 (D. Galenson ed. 1989).
9. The role of government in enforcing these codes of behavior was extremely lim-
ited. The southern code was enforced primarily through social and economic pressure,
with the threat of private violence should less severe sanctions fail. The consequence of
these restrictions was that employment in the South was highly segregated. See Dewey,
Negro Employment in Southern Industry, 60J. POL. ECON. 279 (1952).
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massive federal intervention of the mid-1960s eliminated the overt
effects of covert private violence, of governmental indifference to
black civil rights, and of a white, southern system of shared values
that severely oppressed Blacks. 10 Viewed in these terms, the law
protected the basic civil rights of Blacks by the only means avail-
able-regulation of voting, public accommodations, schooling, and
employment; the law overturned both private consensus and state
legal constraints on the labor market.
The available evidence broadly supports the hypothesis that fed-
eral law improved black relative wages and occupational status.
However, one must be cautious in interpreting the relationship be-
tween specific legislation and black economic progress. Existing
studies use relatively crude measures of the law. More precise mea-
surement of the effects of legal pressure depends on understanding
and modeling the process by which law achieves its impact. The
subtle evolution of legal interpretation and enforcement determines
what business practices the law prohibits or mandates. These legal
obligations should be expected to vary across industries, occupa-
tions, regions, and time. Regrettably, neither the legal nor the eco-
nomic literature contains a careful specification of the evolving
requirements of federal employment discrimination law.'I
Although the available economic evidence cannot distinguish the
effects of specific federal policies or legal doctrines, it does support
some conclusions. Federal employment discrimination policy-
measured as the combined effect of Title VII and the Executive Or-
der-contributed to the post-1964 improvement in black relative
wages and occupational status. The influence of federal pressure
was most pronounced between 1965 and 1975, and in the South
where black wages and integration into manufacturing jobs im-
proved most rapidly. However, it is unlikely that the successes of
10. Social science research on the effects of antidiscrimination law has largely ig-
nored the role of this system of shared values in reinforcing southern segregation. It is
extremely difficult to make precise the notion of community norms, but the segregation-
ist norm pervaded southern life and undoubtedly exerted a powerful constraint on
southern labor markets.
11. For one effort to analyze the process by which employment discrimination law
changes business practices, see Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System and the Southern
Jurisprudence of Employment Discrimination, 6 IND. REL. L.J. 313 (1984); see also Gulp, Federal
Courts and the Enforcement of Title VII, 76 Ab,. EcoN. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 355 (1986);
Gulp, A New Employment Policy for the 1980s: Learning from the Victories and Defeats of Twenty
Years of Title VII, 37 RtrrGERS L. REV. 895 (1985). Although it is beyond the scope of this
article to offer a detailed characterization of the evolution of the law, one of us has
begun research on this problem. See Verkerke, The Evolution of Employment Discrimi-
nation Law: A Legal and Economic History (1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with
the authors).
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the first decade of enforcement will be repeated in the 1990s. The
earlier period was a historically unique opportunity to eliminate the
blatantly discriminatory practices that pervaded southern labor mar-
kets. There is also evidence that many firms benefited from the new
laws and so willingly complied with them. In this environment, the
law was easy to enforce and the potential gains from enforcement
were substantial. While employment discrimination law remains an
important aspect of society's commitment to individual justice and
equal treatment in the labor market, legal pressure is unlikely to sig-
nificantly reduce racial disparity in the 1990s.
The plan of this article is as follows. Section I discusses the avail-
able evidence on changes in the relative economic status of Blacks.
Section II asks whether federal antidiscrimination policy explains
the decline in racial disparity. Section III argues that existing eco-
nomic studies employ imprecise and limited measures of the law.
The conclusion summarizes the policy implications of existing work
on the role of law in reducing racial disparity.
I. The Contours of Black Economic Progress
To assess the contention that federal employment discrimination
law has reduced economic disparity between Blacks and Whites, one
must first determine whether the relative status of black Americans
has in fact improved since significant federal efforts began in the
mid-1960s.1 2 The pattern of black progress across time, geographic
regions, occupations, and industries reveals important clues about
the effects of federal antidiscrimination pressure.
The basic measure of racial differences in economic opportunities
in the labor market is the wage that a person with a given set of
productive characteristics (schooling and experience, for example)
can expect to earn. This wage measures how much the labor market
values a unit of that person's time. It avoids the confounding influ-
ences of decisions concerning labor force participation and hours
worked. Economic comparisons based on income or earnings are
less useful than wage-based comparisons because they implicitly
value time spent away from market work at zero rather than recog-
nizing that an hour of home work or leisure is normally worth as
12. It is understandable that economic studies of federal antidiscrimination policy
have focused on the post-1965 period since both Title VII and Executive Order 11,246
became effective in 1965. However, both the wartime Committee on Fair Employment
Practices and President Kennedy's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity may





much or more than the wage that could be earned in that hour.'3 In
addition, comparisons based on earnings combine the effects of em-
ployment discrimination policies with the effects of various other
employment policies. The market wage, particularly after adjusting
for differences in productive characteristics, measures possible labor
market discrimination more precisely. t4
Whether measured by income, wages, or adjusted wages, the eco-
nomic gap between Blacks and Whites has narrowed. In 1964, the
median income of nonwhite males was 57% of the median white
male income. By 1985, the income ratio had risen to 66%.15 The
wage gap between black and white workers has also declined. In
1939, the average wage of black male workers was only 43% of the
average white wage; by 1979, this wage ratio had improved to
737.16 Adjusted wage figures show somewhat less improvement be-
cause gains in measurable productive characteristics produced much
of black economic progress. Black relative weekly earnings, 17 ad-
justed for the influence of region of residence, urban status, age,
and education, rose from 75% in 1963 to 93% in 1984.18
Other measures of black relative economic status also show signif-
icant improvement. The proportion of black men working as pro-
fessionals or managers relative to the proportion of white male
professionals or managers has doubled from 32% in 1964 to 64% in
13. If individuals are not free to choose their hours of work, an hour of home work
or leisure may be worth less than the prevailing wage rate.
14. The wage is not without problems as a policy measure. If discrimination induces
low wage black workers to drop out of the labor force, then relative wage statistics will
understate the level of labor market disparity between Blacks and Whites. Moreover,
since pure wage discrimination by race is quite rare, relative wage statistics are an indi-
rect measure of hiring and promotional discrimination. Indices of occupational status
offer more direct measures of exclusion from desirable positions. The available occupa-
tional statistics, unfortunately, distinguish only a few extremely broad occupational cate-
gories, making it impossible to determine if Blacks are being relegated to inferior jobs
within these broad categories.
15. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-60,
No. 159, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
1986 at 106-7 (1988).
16. Smith & Welch, Black Economic Progress After Myrdal, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 519, 522
(1989) [hereinafter Smith & Welch, Black Progress]; see alsoJ. SMITH & F. WELCH, CLOSING
THE GAP: FORTY YEARS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS FOR BLACKS 6 (1986) [hereinafter J.
SMrrH & F. WELCH, CLOSING THE GAP]; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE Eco-
NOMIC PROGRESS OF BLACK MEN IN AMERICA 12 (1986). All of these studies rely on re-
ported weekly wage and salary income for their comparisons.
17. Weekly earnings statistics are not strictly comparable to wage figures, but their
movements are closely related.
18. Bound & Freeman, Black Progress: Erosion of the Post-1965 Gains in the 1980s? in
THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 32,
38 (1989). The values of the adjusted earnings ratio for the census years of 1969 and
1979 were 86 percent and 95 percent respectively. Id
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1986.19 A simple index of the similarity of black and white occupa-
tional distributions, which equals 100 when the distributions are
completely dissimilar and zero when the distributions are identical,
improved from 37.1 in 1964 to 21.4 in 1988.20 The convergence of
black and white income distributions offers further evidence of black
economic progress. One measure of the degree of similarity be-
tween the two income distributions is the proportion of black men
whose income exceeds the median white income; this figure tripled
from 8% in 1939 to 29% by 1979.21
In contrast to the optimistic picture of wage and occupational ad-
vance for employed Blacks, the black unemployment rate has re-
mained approximately twice the level for Whites, and the black
relative labor force participation rate has fallen since the mid-
1960s.22 These data suggest that antidiscrimination pressure has
not solved the economic problems of low income Blacks. Now the
greatest difference between the labor market experiences of Blacks
and Whites is whether Blacks will be employed at all. 23
A closer examination of the data by time, region, occupation, and
industry reveals important details within the general pattern of wage
improvement.
A. Time
First, there is little doubt that significant black economic progress
occurred over a relatively short period of time. The rate of black
progress accelerated between 1965 and 1975, then leveled off after
19. lId at 34.
20. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS 78 (1989); HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 44, 47 (1983). The index equals the
sum of the absolute differences between the percentage of black workers and the per-
centage of white workers in each occupational classification divided by two.
21. J. SMrmH & F. WELCH, CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 16, at 10.
22. Butler & Heckman, supra note 7, at 238.
23. There is as yet no generally accepted explanation for the decline in labor force
participation. One view is that the expansion of government transfer programs begin-
ning in the mid-1960s, particularly the increasing benefits under the social security disa-
bility program, made labor force participation less attractive for marginal workers.
Another possibility is that the relative profitability of nonmarket activities such as selling
drugs increased. Such an explanation may be plausible as applied to young black men,
but it seems unlikely to explain the marked decline in participation of 45 to 65 year old
black men. Unfortunately, existing studies have been unable to either confirm or refute
these hypotheses or to offer a more convincing explanation for declining labor force
participation. The available evidence does suggest, however, that a fraction of the mea-
sured improvement in black economic status is due to the statistical effects of declining





1975. Studying aggregate statistics on the relative income and occu-
pational position of Blacks, Richard Freeman found that the post-
1964 rate of improvement significantly exceeded the pre-1964
rate.24 Subsequent studies by Freeman and others using more re-
cent data have confirmed the existence of this post-1964
acceleration. 25
A detailed study of the South Carolina textile industry demon-
strates stable patterns of racial exclusion over the period 1910 to
1964. During this period the mills employed only a few Blacks, who
performed janitorial or menial outdoor work. After 1964, however,
Blacks made dramatic breakthroughs in employment and wages.26
Even studies that emphasize the role of gradual historical forces in
generating black progress support the view that the rate of change
accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s.2 7 But since 1975 black relative
wages have stagnated. The adjusted weekly earnings ratio, which
had reached approximate parity in 1975, deteriorated slightly
through 1984.28
B. Region
Second, regional data reveal that black progress was most pro-
nounced in the South. In the South the adjusted relative wage rose
from 60% in 1964 to 88% in 1984. The increase in the North dur-
ing the same period, from 88% to 97%, was considerably less dra-
matic. 29 Moreoever, the fact that more than half of the black
population lives in that region magnifies the South's importance.3 0
24. Freeman, Changes in the Labor Market for Black Americans, 1948-1972, 1 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcTivrry 67, 100-5 (1973) [hereinafter Freeman, Changes in the
Labor Market].
25. Freeman, Black Economic Progress after 1964: Who Has Gained and Why? in STUDIES
IN LABOR MARKETS (S. Rosen ed. 1981) (longer time series) [hereinafter Freeman, Black
Progress]; Brown, supra note 7, at 38 (1984) (correcting for changes in relative labor force
participation rates of Blacks and Whites); Bound & Freeman, supra note 18(using indi-
vidual rather than aggregate data); W. Vroman, Industrial Change and Black Men's Rel-
ative Earnings (1989) (unpublished manuscript presented at Yale University Micro-
Economics Workshop on Labor and Population Sept. 19, 1989) (using Social Security
earnings data).
26. Heckman & Payner, supra note 8; see also Butler, Heckman & Payner, supra note 8.
27. Smith & Welch, Black Progress, supra note 16, at 528.
28. Bound & Freeman, supra note 18, at 38. For further confirmation of the post-
1975 slowdown in black progress, seeJuhn, Murphy & Pierce, Accounting for the Slow-
down in Black-White Wage Convergence (1990) (unpublished manuscript presented at
Yale University Micro-Economics Workshop on Labor and Population on May 1, 1990);
Kasarda, Urban Change and Minority Opportunities, in THE NEW URBAN REALrrY (P. Peterson
ed. 1985).
29. Bound & Freeman, supra note 18, at 38.
30. In 1970 and 1980, 53 percent of Blacks lived in the South. U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, STATE AND METROPOLrrAN AREA DATA BOOK 1986 at 504.
283
Yale Law & Policy Review
Other studies document the concentration of black progress in
the South. For example, the strongest post-1964 relative wage
gains were in the South.3 1 There is also evidence of rapid desegre-
gation of Southern firms.3 2 Richard Butler, James Heckman, and
Brook Payner report that two-thirds of the black economic advance
between 1959 and 1969 occurred below the Mason-Dixon line.33
Southern wages for both Blacks and Whites have historically been
less than those for other regions, and the wage penalty for southern
residence was greater for Blacks.3 4 Between 1969 and 1979 Blacks
and Whites converged in this measure of southern inequality.3 5
C. Occupation and Industry
Examining black economic progress by occupation and industry
reveals other interesting facts. First, Blacks employed in higher
level managerial and professional jobs experienced the greatest ad-
vances in relative wages.36 Second, the largest movements of black workers
into new and higher paying occupations came in unskilled and low-
skill blue collar job classifications such as manufacturing
operatives.3 7
The large relative wage movements at the upper end of the occu-
pational distribution are signs of progress. The vast majority of
black workers, however, work at lower level jobs, a pattern that was
even more pronounced in 1964 than it is today. Developments in
blue collar and lower skill labor markets thus have a disproportion-
ately strong influence on black economic status. The rapid entry of
large numbers of black workers into higher paying occupations such
as manufacturing operatives accounts for a far larger portion of
31. Freeman, Black Progress, supra note 25, at 277; Butler & Heckman, supra note 7;
Freeman, Changes in the Labor Market, supra note 24, at 105.
32. Ashenfelter & Heckman, Measuring the Effect of an Anti-Discrimination Program, in
EVALUATING THE LABOR-MARKET EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROGRAMS (1976).
33. Butler, Heckman & Payner, supra note 8, at 262; see also Heckman & Payner, supra
note 8; Butler & Heckman, supra note 7.
34. The wage penalty for southern residence refers to the amount by which the
wages for residents of the South are lower than the wages of otherwise comparable non-
southerners.
35. J. SMITH & F. WELCH, CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 16, at 48.
.36. Many studies have found greater wage gains for black workers with higher skill
and education. See, e.g., Freeman, Changes in the Labor Market, supra note 24; Freeman,
Black Progress, supra note 25; Smith & Welch, Affirmative Action and Labor Markets, 2 J. LAB.
EcoN. 269 (1984). This feature of the change has come to be known as the "pro-skill
bias" of affirmative action pressure.
37. See Heckman & Payner, supra note 8; Butler, Heckman & Payner, supra note 8;




black progress than do the wage gains for higher level occupa-
tions.38 In contrast to the relative deterioration of the position of
unskilled black workers, highly educated Blacks now appear to earn
salaries comparable to Whites with equal education and experi-
ence.39 These relative wage gains are likely to be permanent since
the demand for highly skilled workers continues to grow.
The importance of the manufacturing sector to black workers has
influenced the degree to which the gains of the post-1964 period
were maintained into the 1980s. A significant decline in the un-
skilled labor market appears to have caused the post-1975 stagna-
tion in relative black status. 40 The South Carolina textile industry
illustrates how the manufacturing industry's decline diminished
Blacks' relative status. During the 1960s and early 1970s large num-
bers of black workers were hired in the southern textile industry, an
industry from which they had been largely excluded. 41 However, in
the early 1980s, due to increasing competition from foreign textile
mills, many southern mills closed and Blacks lost their past employ-
ment gains.42 A similar pattern has been repeated in other manufac-
turing industries throughout the country.
To summarize the important findings on the contours of black
economic progress: The gap between the wages of Blacks and
Whites has narrowed substantially. However, the improvements in
black relative wages were quite different across time, regions, and
occupations. In particular, black relative wage gains were most pro-
nounced in the South during the period 1965 to 1975, and black
employment grew most rapidly in low-skill, blue-collar occupations.
Black relative wages have stagnated since 1975, most likely due to
the collapse of the U.S. manufacturing industry and the attendant
loss of many relatively high-paying, low-skilljobs. At the upper end
38. Heckman & Payner, supra note 8.
39. R. FREEMAN, BLACK ELrrE: THE NEW MARKET FOR HIGHLY QUALIFIED BLACK
AMERICANS (1977); Freeman, Black Progress, supra note 25.
40. See sources cited supra note 7. There has been an increase in the relative pre-
mium for skilled labor. The wages of unskilled workers have fallen as jobs for these
workers largely disappear, leaving a large pool of unskilled workers to compete for rela-
tively fewjobs. As a result, Blacks, who are disproportionately concentrated in low-skilljobs, have fared poorly since 1975. See Kasarda, supra note 28; Juhn, Murphy & Pierce,
supra note 28.
41. See Heckman & Payner, supra note 8.
42. Employment in the textile mill products industry grew by 8%o between 1-964 and
1974 but diminished by 23% between 1974 and 1984. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATIsTICs 295 (1989).
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of the occupational and skill distribution, highly educated Blacks ap-
pear at present to earn wages similar to those earned by Whites of
similar measured skills.
I. Identifying the Role of Employment Discrimination Law
Although the statistics on black progress are reasonably uncon-
troversial, economists are divided about how to interpret these
facts. In particular, they disagree over the degree to which federal
civil rights policies contributed to improving black economic status.
One view, which we will call the "continuous change" hypothesis,
holds that long-term trends in black migration and relative educa-
tional attainment explain improvements in black status. A compet-
ing view, which we will call the "discontinuous change" hypothesis,
emphasizes the temporal coincidence of federal civil rights law and
the post-1964 acceleration in black progress. Any effort to evaluate
the competing theories of black progress should focus on the com-
parative ability of the theories to explain the pattern of black eco-
nomic advance, in particular the central role of black improvement
in the South and the acceleration of black economic progress during
the period 1965 to 1975.
A. The Continuous Change Hypothesis
Continuity theorists emphasize the role of long-term trends in mi-
gration and educational attainment in their explanation of black
progress. Adherents to this view thus minimize the importance of
antidiscrimination efforts. James Smith and Finis Welch, the fore-
most proponents of the continuous change hypothesis, believe fed-
eral law and other antidiscrimination programs have had a marginal
impact:
[T]he racial wage gap narrowed as rapidly in the 20 years prior to 1960
(and before affirmative action) as during the 20 years afterward. This
suggests that the slowly evolving historical forces we have emphasized
... education and migration-were the primary determinants of the
long-term black economic improvement. At best, affirmative action
has marginally altered black wage gains around this long-term trend.43
Despite an emphasis on "historical forces" that evolved slowly over
the entire period under study, Smith and Welch's own work under-
mines the continuity hypothesis. Their results show that the sources
of black improvement differed dramatically across decades. Black




migration out of the South, for example, played an important role in
early decades but declined in importance after 1965. 4 4
An even more severe problem for continuity theorists is how to
explain the rapid acceleration of black progress after 1964. Propo-
nents of the continuity hypothesis argue that the relative improve-
ments in black schooling explain black progress after 1960. 4 5
However, the convergence in years of schooling completed does not
explain this progress. Rather it is improvement in the return to
black schooling relative to white schooling;46 more than 80% of the
estimated contribution of education to black progress comes from
this source. 47 Proponents of the continuity hypothesis argue that as
the quality of black schools improved relative to the quality of white
schools, the market payment for black schooling increased relative
to that for white schooling.
There is some historical evidence to support this claim. 48 Aggre-
gate data on relative term length and schooling expenditures in seg-
regated southern schools markedly improved during the mid-1940s.
Black children educated in these schools appeared in the labor mar-
ket in the mid-1960s. It is possible, therefore, that improvements in
the quality of schooling account for much of the black economic ad-
vance in the South in the 1960s.
There are, however, several important reasons to treat this inter-
pretation with some skepticism. First, there is no direct evidence
linking increased black school quality to improvements in the return
to schooling. In fact, even the aggregate evidence on relative
schooling quality is somewhat ambiguous. Although term length at
black schools converged toward levels found in white schools during
the period in question, the rapid growth in the other important mea-
sure of school quality, school expenditures, may not signal an im-
provement in school quality. Much of the growth in school
expenditures for black schools came from a relative increase in the
salaries of teachers in black schools, which resulted from an NAACP
44. Donohue & Heckman, supra note 1.
45. Smith & Welch, Black Progress, supra note 16.
46. Id. The return to schooling measures the increase in wages produced by an ad-
ditional year of schooling.
47. Donohue & Heckman, supra note 1.
48. This evidence is reviewed in greater detail in Donohue & Heckman, supra note 1.
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salary equalization drive. At least in the early years after equaliza-
tion, the same teachers were simply paid more.49 Finally, all age
groups, even those who had completed their schooling before the
1940s, experienced post-19 6 0 increases in their estimated returns to
schooling. If schooling quality improvements were an important
determinant of increased returns, only those workers who could
have benefited from enhanced school quality should have received
higher returns. The relative improvement in the return to schooling
for Blacks of all age groups is more consistent with a decline in mar-
ket discrimination than with an improvement in school quality.50
B. The Discontinuous Change Hypothesis
Because the discontinuous increase in black relative wages, the
passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the adop-
tion of affirmative action requirements for federal contractors all oc-
curred at the same time, many scholars believe government policy
played an important role in improving black economic status. 5' De-
spite the fact that the evidence for the continuity hypothesis suffers
from several internal contradictions we should be cautious about
embracing the discontinuity hypothesis. First, the correlation be-
tween the federal intervention and the acceleration of black pro-
gress might be purely spurious. One could argue that changing
attitudes about employment discrimination sparked both the adop-
tion of new federal policies and the rapid improvement in black sta-
tus. An additional problem for those who claim that federal policy
was important is that enforcement agency budgets were small and
their powers were weak during the period of greatest black relative
wage gains.
The warning that "correlation is not causation" applies with par-
ticular force to the attempt to infer from aggregate time series data
that employment discrimination laws caused a change in the labor
market. It is possible that the attitudinal changes that made the leg-
islative or executive action possible were the true cause of the ob-
served change in the labor market. On this view, federal policies
merely expressed underlying changes in attitudes, which themselves
49. Id It is possible that higher salaries inspired black teachers to improve their
teaching. However, to the extent that schooling quality improvements depend on at-
tracting more highly qualified teachers, the effects of salary equalization would be felt
only after potential teachers had time to adjust their expectations and plans.
50. This point is conceded in Smith & Welch, Black Progress, supra note 16; see also
Donohue & Heckman, supra note 1.
51. See, e.g., Freeman, Black Progress, supra note 25; Freeman, Changes in the Labor Afar-




produced a decline in discrimination. Ironically, the shift in na-
tional attitude that made possible the enactment of Title VII was in
part produced by the persistence and virulence of southern racial
discrimination. 52 Southern attitudes undoubtedly changed to some
extent during this period, but the disaggregated statistics on south-
ern labor markets reveal a stable and persistent pattern of exclusion.
Consequently, Title VII primarily sought to eliminate a characteris-
tically southern pattern of occupational segregation.53 Southern
political leaders resisted vigorously, and yet it was in the South that
the law had its greatest effect.
Critics of the discontinuity hypothesis emphasize administrative
agencies' poorly coordinated enforcement efforts during the first
years of concerted federal antidiscrimination activity from 1965 to
1975-the decade that witnessed dramatic black relative wage
gains. 54 For example, they point to the remedies available to agen-
cies against federal contractors who discriminated. These remedies
include debarment, 55 but very few federal contractors have been
debarred under the Executive Order. The EEOC did not have au-
thority to sue employers until 1972, and its funding for investiga-
tions remained at a low level well into the 1970s.
To focus only on the funding and effectiveness of the enforce-
ment agencies is to neglect the crucial role private litigation plays in
enforcing employment discrimination law. Title VII initially limited
the EEOC to conference, conciliation, and persuasion, but in 1965
private parties obtained the right to challenge discriminatory prac-
tices in federal court.56 The threat of private litigation provided im-
mediate incentives for employers to comply with Title VII. Even
before it gained the right to sue, the EEOC exerted influence by
pressing for expansive interpretations of the law through its issu-
ance of administrative guidelines. The Supreme Court, for exam-
ple, referred to the EEOC's Guidelines on Employment Testing
52. See, e.g., C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Acr xviii-xx (1985) (recounting brutality of Birming-
ham's "Negro-baiting police chief, Bull Connor" and its role in leading President
Kennedy to submit civil rights bill to Congress).
53. Il at 212 (complaints of Senator Strom Thurmond that Civil Rights Act was
targeted exclusively at South).
54. See, e.g., Ahart, A Process Evaluation of the Contract Compliance Program in Nonconstruc-
tion Industry, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 565 (1976).
55. Other penalties include adverse publicity, injunctive relief, fines, back-pay
awards, and contract suspension or cancellation. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339,
343-44 (1964-1965).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f(1) (1982).
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Procedures in its landmark decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 57 The
EEOC's impact during this early period thus appears to have been
greater than its meager budget would indicate.
By adopting a broader view of the scope of the federal attack on
discrimination, one also can see how various aspects of the federal
antidiscrimination programs were mutually reinforcing. During the
same period in which Title VII was enacted, Congress and the fed-
eral courts challenged other facets of the southern pattern of racial
subordination. Voting rights, school desegregation, and public ac-
commodations were important noneconomic areas in which federal
pressure increased. 58 The simultaneous federal attack on discrimi-
nation in employment, voting, schooling, and public accommoda-
tions was far more likely to succeed than a law limited to just one of
these areas.
For many southern employers, the prohibition of employment
discrimination dramatically expanded the pool of available workers.
Private entrepreneurs' earlier attempts to integrate southern textile
plants in isolated mill villages failed. 59 Butler, Heckman, and
Payner document that employing Blacks slowed the growth of labor
costs and kept the South Carolina textile industry competitive in the
face of foreign competition. 60 Since social and economic sanctions
played an important role in preventing firms from employing
Blacks, employers complied willingly with a law that provided an ex-
cuse to do what was in their economic interest. Studies of budget
allocations and the like ignore the fact that the economic incentive
for nondiscrimination created a powerful leverage effect for the law.
This fact helps to explain why black employment prospects im-
proved, despite weak enforcement of the law.
It would be a grave mistake to attribute all of the post-1964 black
progress in relative wages and blue collar employment to civil rights
laws. Social activism in the South, improvements in schooling qual-
ity, and southern industrial growth played significant roles. How-
ever, the record from the South demonstrates that the labor market
57. 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
58. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Civil Rights Act of 1957,
Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Star. 634; Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat.
86; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; Voting Rights Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
59. G. Wright, Segregation and Racial Wage Differentials in the South Before World
War II (Stanford University, 1988) (unpublished manuscript); Butler, Heckman &
Payner, supra note 8.




for Blacks improved in a way that can most convincingly be ex-
plained by assigning a major role to federal civil rights policy.
III. Measuring the Impact of the Law
Quantifying the law in order to measure its impact is a trouble-
some problem. One common approach analyzes the timing of black
economic progress in relation to the advent of federal antidis-
crimination pressure. When improvement in black relative status
coincides with the enactment of federal laws prohibiting discrimina-
tion and mandating affirmative action for federal contractors, the
claim that the law caused the improvement is more credible. Alter-
native approaches to the measurement problem study specific meas-
ures of enforcement activity, rely on anecdotal and survey evidence
concerning changes in employment practices, or compare minority
employment growth for federal contractors with that of
noncontractors.
A. Timing
Understanding the timing of changes in black relative economic
status is an important first step toward establishing a causal relation-
ship between federal policy and black progress. The strongest evi-
dence of federal policy effects is the acceleration of the rate of black
economic progress after 1964. However, this trend variable is an
inherently limited measure of the law. 6 ' A post-1964 trend variable
measures the influence of both Title VII and the Executive Order
program along with any other concurrent events that affected the
labor market. For the purposes of policy analysis, a trend can re-
veal, under the best of circumstances, whether the net effect of all
federal policies intended to improve black status worked toward the
desired result. However, a trend cannot distinguish the effects of
simultaneous legal interventions, or the influence of doctrinal inno-
vations such as the disparate impact theory under Title VII or the
use of goals and timetables under the Executive Order program.
There also are ambiguities concerning the appropriate starting
date for measuring federal antidiscrimination pressure. Economic
studies of antidiscrimination policy effects have uniformly adopted
1965 as the date at which the impact of federal policy should be-
come discernible. Two important legal events that occurred in 1965
61. A trend variable takes the value I in the first year, 2 in the second year, and so
on. It measures the average change from year to year after controlling for the other
variables in the regression. This variable is a statistical synonym for time.
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support this choice: the provisions of Title VII, which went into ef-
fect on July 2, 1965, and Executive Order 11,246 which became ef-
fective on October 24, 1965. Each will be discussed below.
The practical effects of Title VII depended on administrative and
judicial interpretation of the statute. Important doctrines such as
the disparate impact theory and the rules for awarding back pay
were not established until many years after 1965.62 Far from estab-
lishing a well-defined and fully developed system of law, the effec-
tive date of Title VII marked the beginning of an uneven, and often
unpredictable, pattern of doctrinal development. By failing to dis-
entangle the disparate elements of this doctrinal pattern, existing
studies incorrectly conflate early developments with later ones.
Nor is it clear that 1965 marked the advent of federal antidis-
crimination pressure on federal government contractors. Executive
Order 11,246 was only part of a complex historical pattern of an-
tidiscrimination pressure on federal contractors. Beginning in
1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's wartime Executive Order
880263 established a Committee on Fair Employment Practice to en-
sure nondiscrimination in the defense industries. Although this Or-
der and its immediate successor, Executive Order 9346,64 appear to
have temporarily reduced employment discrimination against
Blacks, the Committee was dissolved in 1946. Subsequent orders
issued by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower produced little more
than studies of the problem. 65
The first Order to have serious enforcement provisions was Presi-
dent Kennedy's Executive Order 10,925, issued in 1961.66 This Or-
der established the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity, which initiated the voluntary Plans for Progress pro-
gram and processed many more complaints far more expeditiously
than did its predecessors. 67 Executive Order 11,246, issued in 1965,
largely incorporated the provisions of the Kennedy Order, but
62. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate impact; six years
later); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (back pay doctrine; ten years
later).,
63. 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 compilation) (issued onJune 25, 1941).
64. 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943 compilation) (issued on May 27, 1943).
65. See, e.g., M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOY-
MENT 9-17, 254-58 (1966).
66. 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 compilation) (issued on March 6, 1961).
67. M. SOVERN, supra note 67, at 106. The Committee's jurisdiction was, like that of




transferred administrative responsibility from the President's Com-
mittee to the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary of Labor estab-
lished the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) to carry
out his responsibility to administer the Order and to adopt the nec-
essary rules and regulations. Each contracting agency retained re-
sponsibility for obtaining compliance with the Order.68 The
transfer, coupled with increasing budgets for the OFCC, appears to
have increased enforcement activity such as compliance reviews and
the issuance of formal regulations. However, the OFCC continued
to emphasize the same methods of conference and conciliation that
had characterized the work of the President's Committee. Begin-
ning in 1968, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC)
required contractors to prepare written affirmative action plans
designed to eliminate any "underutilization" of black workers.6 9
Thus, it would be most accurate to say that antidiscrimination pres-
sure on federal contractors increased in the early 1960s and then
increased again in the late 1960s as the OFCC became more active.
B. Specific Measures of Enforcement
Because trend variables are of limited usefulness for analyzing
legal interventions, it is important to recognize that variables with
other labels are often little more than the functional equivalent of
trend variables. For example, some studies of black economic pro-
gress have used cumulative EEOC expenditures as an indicator of
federal enforcement activity.7 0 Since EEOC expenditures increased
fairly smoothly during the post-1964 period, the expenditure varia-
ble is equivalent to a post-1964 trend variable. Other measures of
specific enforcement activity can be distinguished from a trend vari-
able. Among these alternative measures are variables such as the
number of discrimination claims filed, the percentage of plaintiff vic-
tories, the percentage of favorable appellate rulings, and, finally, the
presence of an EEOC regional office. 7'
68. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 compilation) (issued Sept. 24,
1965)
69. The initial OFCC regulations were issued on May 1, 1968. Subsequent elabora-
tions of the affirmative action requirement were Order No. 4, issued February 5, 1970,
and Revised Order No. 4, issued in 1971. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1 to 60-4, 60-20, 60-50.
70. See, e.g., Freeman, Black Progress, supra note 25.
71. See Belier, The Economics of Enforcement of an Antidiscrimination Law: Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 359 (1978) (number of charges filed with EEOC
in each state, presence of EEOC regional office); Burstein, Equal Employment Opportunity
Legislation and the Income of Women and Nonwhites, 44 AM. Soc. REV. 367 (1979) (percent-
age of plaintiff victories); Culp, A New Employment Polity, supra note I I(percentage of
favorable rulings, percentage of procedural as against substantive rulings); Freeman,
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An intuitively appealing approach to the problem of measuring
specific enforcement activity is to count the number of claims filed
under the relevant law. One difficulty with this approach is that
claim counting measures legalflows without accounting for the effect
of the stock of legal rules. 72 To the extent that prior cases have estab-
lished clear legal standards, the existing stock of legal rules governs
behavior without the need for further litigation. An equally impor-
tant problem is that claim counting ignores the composition of the
flow of legal cases. As the law evolves, the nature of litigated cases
varies for a variety of reasons unrelated to the amount of legal pres-
sure applied. 73 Finally, it is quite conceivable that the regions, in-
dustries or occupations with more claims are simply those more
resistant to complying with the law. Cases filed could indicate the
extent of the problem-rather than the amount of legal pressure ap-
plied. As long as we consider voluntary compliance part of the law's
effects, fewer cases do not necessarily mean the law has exerted little
influence. If voluntary compliance is widespread then counting
claims is perverse. The number of claims filed is then more a mea-
sure of resistance to compliance than an accurate index of the influ-
ence of the law.
Similar problems arise in using the percentage of plaintiff victo-
ries, the percentage of favorable appellate rulings, or the mix of
procedural and substantive rulings to measure the degree of legal
pressure. The percentage of plaintiff victories at trial depends on
both the prevailing legal standard and the distribution of disputes
that come to trial.74 Plaintiffs and defendants must weigh the com-
peting costs and benefits of litigating a case to final judgment or
settling their dispute. The factors that determine which disputes are
settled and which are litigated (such as, the stakes to the parties and
the amount of uncertainty) bear little, if any, relation to amount of
legal pressure felt by employers. The decision to appeal involves
similar considerations. As a result, the distribution of appellate
Black Progress, supra note 25(percentage of favorable rulings); Leonard, The Effectiveness of
Equal Employment Law and Affirmative Action Regulation, in 8 RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOM-
'Cs 319 (S. Rosen ed. 1986) (number of Title VII class action law suits).
72. For a simple model of law as a capital stock, see Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent-
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976).
73. For a discussion of the changing composition of Title VII claims filed, see J.
Donohue & P. Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litiga-
tion (April 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors).





cases is even less likely to represent the overall distribution of dis-
putes. Since an appellate court's ability to render favorable rulings
is largely determined by the distribution of cases that are appealed,
the proportion of favorable rulings is unlikely to bear any systematic
relationship to the level of legal pressure. Similarly, the distribution
of appellate cases largely determines the proportion of substantive
and procedural rulings.
C. Anecdotal and Survey Evidence
A more direct approach to measuring the effects of the law on
employment practices is to rely on surveys of businesses and anec-
dotal evidence concerning changes in personnel practices. In 1976,
the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) surveyed personnel executives
about their companies' responses to federal employment discrimi-
nation law. Of the companies responding, 86 percent had formal
equal employment opportunity policies, 75 while 60 percent reported
that they had changed their selection procedures in response to fed-
eral law. 76 In addition, more than half of the firms surveyed had spe-
cial minority recruiting programs to help achieve their equal
employment opportunity goals."7 A series of studies sponsored by
the Conference Board documented the dramatic changes in person-
nel practices since the enactment of Title VII, as well as the impor-
tance of federal policy in altering employer's personnel policies.7 8
Economists are generally suspicious of anecdotal and survey evi-
dence. They prefer to observe directly the choices that individuals
and firms make in the market. While this stance does guard against
the selective citation of supportive anecdotes, a broader conception
of admissible evidence may be appropriate in this difficult inquiry.
At the very least, anecdotal and survey evidence could generate hy-
potheses to be tested by more conventional means.
75. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: PROGRAMS AND
RESULTS 15 (1976).
76. Id., at 4.
77. Id., at 2. Richard Freeman has characterized the BNA survey results as docu-
menting "the far-reaching impact of the federal equal employment pressures on corpo-
rate labor market behavior." Freeman, Black Progress, supra note 25, at 281. See also
Blumrosen, supra note I 1; Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59, 107 (1972) (further anecdotal
evidence of changes in personnel practices induced by federal pressure).
78. R.G. SHAEFFER, NONDISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES,
1963-1972 (1973); R.G. SHAEFFER, NONDISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: A BROADENING
AND DEEPENING NATIONAL EFFORT, 1973-1975 (1975); R.G. SHAEFFER, NONDISCRIMINA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT-AND BEYOND (1980).
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D. Minority Employment Growth in Government Contractors
Part of the economic literature on employment discrimination fo-
cuses on the effects of a specific program-the Executive Order con-
tract compliance program. By comparing the rate of growth of
relative minority employment and occupational status in firms with
government contracts to the rate of minority employment growth in
firms that without them, these studies purport to measure the effects
of the Executive Order's affirmative action obligations. 79 The in-
crease in the rate of growth for contractors is compared to the rate
of growth for noncontractors, who are covered by Title VII. These
studies attempt to capture the incremental effect on contractors'
employment decisions of imposing affirmative action obligations in
addition to Title VII's nondiscrimination requirement.
Although economic studies consistently find higher minority em-
ployment growth in contractor firms, the interpretation of these re-
sults remains somewhat ambiguous. 80 One possible interpretation
of differential rates of minority employment growth is that the af-
firmative action obligation caused a shift of black workers into the
covered sector. If minority workers are highly responsive to im-
proved employment opportunities, the observed higher rate of
growth could represent little more than black workers moving into
the protected sector,8' with little or no overall effect on black wages
or employment.
In an attempt to measure the wage effect directly, James Smith
and Finis Welch compared black relative wages in industries that
sold a high proportion of total output to the federal government to
relative wages in industries that sold a low proportion of output to
the government.82 Smith and Welch found little relative wage differ-
ence between the two sectors. From this result, the authors con-
cluded that the Executive Order program had minimal effects.8 3
Such an interpretation is unwarranted, however, because of an am-
biguous feature of the wage comparison. The large movement of
79. See, e.g., Heckman & Wolpin, Does the Contract Compliance Program J1ork?An Analysis
of Chicago Data, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 544 (1976); Ashenfelter & Heckman, supra
note 32; Goldstein & Smith, The Estimated Impact of the Antidiscrimination Program Aimed at
Federal Contractors, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 523 (1976); Leonard, supra note 73.
80. For further elaboration of these ambiguities, see Donohue & Heckman, supra
note 1.
81. Id
82. A more appropriate comparison would be between industries with a large pro-
portion of employment in contractor firms and those industries with low proportions.





workers into the covered sector would be expected to reduce the
supply of black workers in the noncontracting sector. This supply
restriction could cause noncontractor employers to bid up the rela-
tive wages of black workers. A comparison of contracting sector
wages to noncontracting sector wages may significantly understate
the true wage effect of the Executive Order program. In short, com-
paring wage rates across sectors may reveal even less about the ef-
fects of the Executive Order than does comparing rates of black
employment growth.
At this point, it should be clear that existing measures of federal
antidiscrimination policy suffer from serious interpretive problems.
Chief among these problems is the fact that existing measures are
ill-suited to distinguish the effects of specific polices. Although
strong evidence indicates that federal employment discrimination
policies improved Blacks' relative wages and occupational status,
this conclusion provides little guidance as to the costs and benefits
of introducing new programs and doctrines or changing existing
ones. Only evidence concerning the effects of speczfic policies can
guide policy formulation. For instance which was responsible for
the rapid black progress of 1965 to 197 5-the Executive Order or
Title VII? What role did the disparate impact doctrine play in accel-
erating the transformation of business practices? Were the nondis-
crimination provisions of the law sufficient to produce the observed
improvements or did numerical goals and timetables involve signifi-
cant preferential treatment for black workers? Existing studies can-
not answer these questions.
IV. Conclusions
This article considers current economic research on the role of
federal law in reducing economic disparity between Blacks and
Whites. The available evidence demonstrates that federal employ-
ment discrimination law played a significant role in accelerating the
rate of improvement in black relative wages and occupational status
during the period 1965 to 1975, particularly in the South. This is
not, however, cause for optimism about the future role of employ-
ment discrimination law in eliminating racial economic disparity.
Although the law succeeded in the South between 1965 and 1975,
it appears to have had little aggregate effect since then. Eliminating
the South's overtly discriminatory practices explained a great deal of
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the improvement in black economic status. The prohibition of bla-
tant discrimination was reasonably easy to enforce and led to signifi-
cant advances for black workers. In fact, many employers,
particularly southern manufacturing firms, probably welcomed the
larger supply of workers. It is unwise, though, to extrapolate from
the achievements of the first decade of federal intervention to the
potential for improvement in the 1990s. The earlier period
presented a historically unique opportunity to eliminate blatantly
discriminatory practices without serious danger of impinging on the
overall efficiency of the labor market. The remaining targets for em-
ployment discrimination law are considerably less clear and appear
to offer smaller potential gains.
Employment discrimination law remains an important aspect of
our commitment to individual justice in the labor market. The law
continues to protect individual Blacks from both the economic loFS
and the personal indignity of being rejected from employment on
racial grounds. However, the available economic evidence stro.ngly
suggests that the law is unlikely to have a major influence or aggre-
gate racial disparity in the 1990s. Basic economic forces such as the
decline of manufacturing industries and the increasing return for
skilled labor relative to unskilled labor will play a much more promi-
nent role in shaping black relative economic status.
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